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I.
Theoretical debates in the contemporary statutory interpretation
literature have made for some rather strange bedfellows. While
disagreement rages in the law journals and in the pages of the federal
reports about how best to construe statutes,' there is widespread
agreement among scholars and judges of diverse ideological stripes on
the following claim: Intentionalist interpretation, that is, interpretation
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that follows the principle that the will of the authors of the statute ought
to govern the interpretation of legislation where the meaning of such
legislation is in dispute, is deeply problematic as a method of construing
statutes in hard cases.2
These difficulties are viewed by prominent commentators as both
theoretical and practical. The essential theoretical objection is that drawing
conclusions about statutory meaning from the expressed and implied
opinions of (often long-dead) authors is problematic as a matter of both
constitutional and lawmaking theory.3 A touchstone in the debate on
legislative history is the use of extrinsic aids in interpreting legislative
will. The most conspicuous type of extrinsic aid is legislative history,
essentially a catch-all category that includes all published sources of
context making up the "record" of legislative proceedings, including
floor statements by members of Congress and committee reports. Also
described as legislative history are pieces of proposals left on the cutting
room floor, that is, rejected legislative amendments and trial balloons
popped by legislators during, say, committee markups.4 And, perhaps
most controversially of all, actions of various implementation mechanisms,
such as administrative agencies, are oftentimes described as part of the
legislative history-and thus an extrinsic aid to interpretation--of the
statute.5 These extrinsic aids have been criticized vociferously by
statutory interpretation scholars and, increasingly, by conservative jurists
disturbed by what they see as the uncritical, under-theorized reliance by
their judicial colleagues on legislative history to discern statutory
meaning.6
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Of a piece with these practical critiques of extrinsic aids is the critique
by these same scholars and judges of the use of interpretive canons when
construing statutes. Examples of interpretive canons abound, such as the
rule that a statute should be interpreted to avoid a constitutional question
or the rule that a statute should be construed to avoid an absurd result.
The vast range of canons and, indeed, the ability of jurists to apply these
canons to reach nearly any statutory result they desire was noted fifty
years ago by Karl Llewellyn in his famous Vanderbilt Law Review
article. 7 More recently, scholars have noted the practical difficulties
with deploying canons in the service of intentionalist interpretation.
Though canonical construction is an omnipresent part of the modem
practice of statutory interpretation in both federal and state courts, at no
point in American legal history has there been such a paroxysm of
criticism of the use of these aids to interpretation.'
With skill and energy, statutory interpretation theorists from across the
political divide have nearly driven a stake through the heart of
intentionalism as a method of interpretation. With intentionalism on life
support, interpretation theorists have turned their attention to other
topics in legislation and interpretation theory. And with our attention
drawn away from debates over, for example, the uses and misuses of
legislative history, or the desirability of certain interpretive canons, one
might legitimately ask the question: Is there anything new to learn about
statutory interpretation theory?
The impetus for this symposium, under the aegis of the joint
USD/UCSD Law, Economics, and Politics Workshop Series, was this
question. Challenged by the cynical observation that the principal
themes in the statutory interpretation debate have been beaten, like the
proverbial dead horse, vigorously, we invited some of the leading
scholars in public law and legal theory to present their thoughts and
ideas. No effort was made to limit the scope of the debate to precise
questions of statutory interpretation theory; rather, we were interested in
learning as much as possible from these provocative presentations in
order to help shape (and maybe even reconfigure?) a new debate over
legislation and its interpretation.
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(describing the "intellectual warfare" over the canons).

As characterized by its influential critics, intentionalism in interpretation
is useless for two overlapping reasons: Either it is useless for the
theoretical and practical reasons described above or, where it can be of
use, what passes for intentionalism in interpretation is merely an obvious
reliance on the incontrovertible view of the statute's framers. In such
cases, the basic episode is hardly interpretation at all but, rather,
merely the application of the statute to resolve an issue of only minor
controversy. In this perspective, interpretation is, by its nature, a
creative endeavor; when we do interpretation, we are looking outside the
four comers of the statute and also outside the clearly expressed will of
the legislature; we are engaging in the act of creating statutory meaning,
imbuing the statute with a meaning that its authors may or may not have
intended, contemplated, or even understood. To be sure, describing
interpretation as a creative act, independent of legislative intent, tells us
very little in practical terms. This imbuing of meaning may be wholly
distant from the apparent structure of the statute and the process by
which the law was enacted, as the most expansive, "dynamic" theories
of interpretation illustrate'; or the process may struggle to make sense of
the statute's purpose, as the traditional Legal Process approach counseled.°
Yet, the key move is to bracket intentionalism and to thereby reject this
approach as "not interpretation," and, therefore, neither creative nor
especially interesting as a technique for resolving disputes over statutory
meaning.
A different analytic box is constructed by modem interpretation
theorists such as Stanley Fish and Walter Benn Michaels. 1 In this view,
interpretation is necessarily tethered to the will of the authors of the text.
Without fidelity to the authors' views of what his or her text means,
interpretation is impossible. This impossibility is not a feature of the
semantics of interpretation but, rather is because of the deep nature of
the meaning of language and the imperative of attributing to authors of
9.
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1479 (1987).
10.
HENRY M. HART AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
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See also Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the
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texts the responsibility and authority to shape meaning through their
expressions. Elsewhere, we explain how such a view can be defended
on the basis of the modem theory of communication' 2; we also explain
why fidelity to authorial intent is necessary as a matter of constitutional
law and the limited role of the courts in the American lawmaking
process." For now, it is enough to note that there is a well-developed
line of analysis that rejects the bracketing of intentionalism and
interpretation and insists that the latter requiresthe former.
As with the competing view of interpretation described above, this
analysis does not, by its own terms, guide us in the direction of one
approach to interpreting statutes over another. We need to grasp more
than just the best definition of the term interpretation to ground a
comprehensive theory of statutory interpretation. After all, we may yet
want to reject interpretation as a device for resolving disputes over
statutory meaning, instead preferring to reconstruct the statute to
implement a vision attached to the wishes of the judge, the community,
or the current (as contrasted with the enacting) legislature; or we may
want-and, to tip our own hand, we do want-to limit the scope of
judicial discretion by requiring judges to interpret statutes and, thereby,
follow legislative intent;' 4 but the key point is that the eschewing of
legislative will is an activity fundamentally different than interpretation.
Much of the important recent scholarship of statutory interpretation,
including several of the contributions in this symposium, engage this
issue at least indirectly by analyzing judicial approaches to statutory
construction and assessing whether the practice of (so-called) interpretation
in one or another context can be defended on grounds that we can both
understand and appreciate. One of the nice features of the symposium
considered as a whole is that no author undertakes the unwieldy task
of defining the essential purpose of "interpretation" and then proceeding
to develop a comprehensive theory of interpretation. The nine scholars
whose articles are collected herein understand well that progress in
interpretation theory is perhaps best made incrementally; careful attention
to the nature of judicial, legislative, and administrative processes is likely
to contribute usefully to advancing the statutory interpretation debate.
12.
Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory
Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, Loy. L. REV. (symposium issue on
statutory interpretation, forthcoming 2005).
13.
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(ms. 2005).
14.
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In his symposium article,' 5 Vermeule sets out to turn the contemporary
social choice insight about legislatures to the service of criticizing the
basic prescriptive project of advising courts as to how best to interpret
ambiguous statutes. Essentially, Vermeule argues, the same problems that
bedevil the modern legislature will also vex the multi-member
institution that is the federal judiciary. By making the "fundamental
mistake of overlooking the collective character of judicial institutions,"16
interpretation theorists miss out on the relevant complexities of judicial
behavior and thereby risk misaligning their theories with the real world.
This need not be, however, the end of the road for a normative theory
of judicial decision in general or statutory interpretation in particular.
Non-ideal theory, which we take to represent theory that embraces the
messiness of the collective legislative and judicial processes, can assist
courts in interpreting statutes. Such assistance, for reasons Vermeule
explains in detail, must be humble, targeted, and incremental. More
generally, Vermeule suggests that the "fallacy of division," to which
many ambitious interpretation theorists are prone, provides a false
scaffold for dynamic and democracy-forcing theories of constitutional
and statutory interpretation. He provides another set of reasons for
skepticism about these influential views and, thereby, invites us to think
afresh about intentionalism, a theory widely associated with more
"conservative" approaches to discerning statutory meaning.
In a similar vein, social scientists Lupia and McCubbins tackle head
on the social choice questions canvassed in Vermeule's article and also
elsewhere in this symposium. 7 Lupia and McCubbins begin by
describing the famous insight of Kenneth Shepsle that the social choice
critiques of modern legislative processes-in particular, the theoretical
explanation of the point that Congress "is a they, not an it"-justifies a
very narrow approach to discerning legislative intent.1 8 Lupia and
McCubbins use Shepsle's insight as a jumping off point to consider
systematically, and from the vantage point of the very same social
choice theory, the lessons purportedly drawn from this body of social
science scholarship. They demonstrate that the results of the social
15.
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choice critique are actually quite narrow and that adding more realistic
assumptions about human cognition to social choice theory allows us to
draw meaningful inferences about legislative intent. In short, Lupia and
McCubbins argue that social choice theory, when properly understood,
hardly justifies the grave skepticism of legal scholars about the nature
and function of the modem legislative process.
In the end, say Lupia and McCubbins, the social choice results have
been "lost in translation," that is, have been misconstrued as explaining
that legislative intent in any systematic sense is impossible and, moreover,
the democratic quality of statutes is very poor. This mistranslation has
been a serious problem for the efforts of scholars, particularly those
whose training disables them from understanding deeply social choice
theory and evidence and, therefore, the scope and limits of the results
presented. By construing the claims of social choice theorists as casting
doubt on the very notion of a collective legislative intent, legal scholars
have missed the basic insights of these seminal findings; hence, a key
part of the critique of legislative intent and the use of legislative history
has been built on mistakes in the translation of these results.
The Lupia and McCubbins article raises a more global challenge, as
well, to the main vein of contemporary process-perfecting (or what
Vermeule labels "democracy-forcing") theories of interpretation. A
striking feature of the "contemporary positive political theory and law"
scholarship is its embrace of what is seen as the essential thrust of the
Rochester School critique of legislative performance.' 9 Relying on the
accumulated insights of influential rational choice political scientists and
economists, leading legal scholars have manifested cynicism about the
legislative process in their prescriptive efforts to improve representative
democracy through, inter alia, reform of the campaign financing
system, ° the empowerment of (ostensibly downtrodden) political
parties,21 fundamental changes in voting rules and procedures,22 and
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various mechanisms for fostering legislative "deliberation."2 3 More
ambitiously, scholars influenced by the Rochester School and its progeny
have embraced non-legislative institutions, including courts,24 agencies,
and directly democratic techniques such as initiative lawmaking,25 on the
grounds of what we might label the "ABL principle"-that is, anything
but legislatures. Having seen legislative institutions derided as
unrepresentative, unproductive, and infected with the "disease" of
strategic behavior, scholars following the ABL principle have succumbed
to what Lupia and McCubbins might view, for the same reasons
discussed in their symposium article, as the nirvana fallacy. Thus, the
larger objective of their article is to invite us to consider the ways in
which the marriage between social choice theory and prescriptive legal
scholarship must be based on a more nuanced and accurate
understanding of the scholarship under scrutiny.
Just as Lupia and McCubbins' analysis of social choice theory
incorporates key characteristics of human cognition, so too does Fred
Schauer's2' analysis of rules and standards. As Schauer correctly notes,
rules are directives that are typically interpreted mechanically, while
standards give much discretion to the interpreter at the moment of
application. Although it is commonplace to distinguish between rules
and standards, Schauer adds a new twist to these concepts by noting
interpreters' tendency to blur rules into standards and to translate
standards into rules. Schauer then notes that such blurring of rules into
standards may lead to interpretations that diverge from the intent of
Congress, and he also emphasizes that when interpreters translate
standards into rules, they actually choose to limit their own discretion.
Interestingly, Schauer argues that such "standardification of rules" and
"rulification of standards" may not entail discretion seeking or blame
shirking by judges and agency officials interpreting statutes, but rather
may be natural consequences of human cognitive processes. Indeed,
humans may strive for an optimal mix of specificity and discretion when
making decisions. As Schauer notes, humans often insist on some
choice, but also take actions to limit their own choices, presumably to
save cognitive and decision making costs. If this is the case, one
23.
See, e.g., JAMES FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS (1998).

24.
See William H. Riker and Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of
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PUBLIC POLICY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004).
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implication of Schauer's work is that Congress may need to take into
account the cognitive limits of the interpreters of its statutes in its design
of rules and standards.
From the Olympian heights of abstract social choice theory and
human cognition, the next contribution in this symposium comes down
closer to the ground and considers carefully and insightfully a major
claim made in the recent literature on statutory interpretation about the
characteristics of certain types of statutes. Legal scholars Daniel Farber
and Brett McDonnell look closely at the watershed federal antitrust
legislation of the late 19th century, legislation that undergirds modem
antitrust law. 27 Notwithstanding the enactment of key statutes including,
most importantly, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, antitrust law is
viewed by commentators as a quintessential example of a statute that is
more evocative of the common law and the correlative charge to courts
to fashion a body of law free from the strictures of statutory language
and legislative intent. More broadly, Eskridge and Ferejohn describe the
Sherman Act as a "super statute," that is, a statute that... "seeks to
establish a new normative or institutional framework for state policy."28
In their article, Farber and McDonnell develop a coherent account of
this legislation that contradicts the conventional explanation of national
antitrust legislation as something distinct, as a "super statute." Their
approach is classically inductive; they dig deep into the structure of the
law and policy of anticompetitive behavior circa late nineteenth century
and explain how the understanding of the congressmen who created the
foundational legislation was more maturely formed and comprehensive
than was understood either at the time by Justice Holmes and his
brethren or by influential modem commentators. Farber and McDonnell
build upon these insights to critique both the new textualism as it applies
to statutes such as the Sherman Antitrust Act and also the "dynamic"
approaches that mostly ignore the text and context of the statute,
preferring, pace Holmes, to fashion an exogenous common law of
antitrust.
The inductive technique of Farber and McDonnell is a neglected, but
extremely valuable, one. In a world in which statutory interpretation theorists
mostly apply wide-ranging theory to particular statutory contexts, the
27.
Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, "Is There a Text in this Class?" The
Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619 (2005).
28.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1216 (2001).

alternative approach helps us better to understand the contour and
contexts of real statutes in the real world. The Eskridge and Ferejohn
typology of super statutes has an elegant power that grabs our attention;
in the hands of these able theorists, we can be tempted to embrace more
dynamic interpretation of lodestar statutes on the grounds that such an
approach makes the best sense of our heroic political history. On closer
inspection, however, this history is compiled through episodes of
considerably more complex political activities; statutes are, after all,
products of strategic behavior by diversely motivated legislators acting
under conditions of institutional constraints, imperfect information, and
various sorts of scarcity. Farber and McDonnell's excellent analysis of
the antitrust laws raises the question "what makes certain statutes super
or, instead, just ordinary?"
The effort to ground a particular approach to interpretation in a
positive and normative view of lawmaking is a theme that is discussed,
as well, in the co-editors contribution to this symposium. In our article
on the appropriations canon of statutory interpretation,29 we revisit the
appropriations canon, that is, the rule that substantive legislative changes
through the appropriations process are to be disfavored. This canon is
the descendant of the hoary rule that "repeals by implication are
disfavored." The idea behind this old rule is that courts must be able to
discern whether and to what extent Congress really meant to repeal an
earlier statute. By putting the onus on Congress, legislators presumably
had to bear the appropriate costs in refashioning through ordinary
legislative processes an earlier statute.
Yet, as Mathew McCubbins and Daniel Rodriguez explain, the modem
appropriations canon is really a very different animal. The canon arose
first in two major cases interpreting the Endangered Species Act. In
both instances, Congress rather clearly amended, and through processes
that were clearly consistent with Article I, Section 7, acts that carved out
certain federal activity from the scope of that broad statute. Nonetheless,
the Court insisted that such changes through the appropriations process
were problematic; in particular, this legislative behavior illustrated the
essentially undeliberative, and hence flawed, product of modem
appropriations lawmaking. The modem canon, thus, is grounded in a
distinct normative view of the congressional process.
It is this view that we critique in our symposium article. We unpack,
from the vantage point of the positive political theory of lawmaking, the
assumptions underlying the appropriations canon. By questioning these
29. Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and
Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUEs 669 (2005).
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assumptions, we raise larger questions about the function of extrinsic
aids of interpretation. Canonical construction, we argue, must be built
squarely upon a defensible, comprehensive theory of lawmaking and
legal interpretation. It is the connection between this lawmaking theory
and interpretive approach that squarely frames the new theory of
statutory interpretation. Positive political theory is, as we note in this
and other work, the lever with which prescriptive theories of
interpretation-including, importantly, intentionalism and the critique of
intentionalism-will expand in sophistication and in influence.
Elizabeth Garrett offers a very valuable and descriptively rich
contribution to the literature on the contemporary legislative process in
her article on "framework legislation."3 At bottom, Professor Garrett's
paper is about how the legislative process in the modem Congress takes
shape. Too often, courts look at the legislature and its products and do not
see what is really happening. Legislation is typically viewed as policy;
through statutes, the legislature fashions policy through the development
of substantive commands and the creation of implementation devices.
Moreover, the funding choices made by Congress through both its
authorization and appropriations power rounds out the ongoing
policymaking episodes in the areas in which the legislature is
empowered and inclined to act.
Skillfully, Garrett offers a distinctive perspective on this conventional
view of legislative procedure by developing the idea of "framework
legislation." Such legislation, she explains "creates rules that structure
congressional lawmaking; these laws establish internal procedures that
will shape legislative deliberation and voting with respect to certain laws
or decisions in the future." Frequently, Garrett explains, these framework
laws will impact directly all three branches of government; hence, courts
will frequently be called upon to interpret legislation that, intriguingly,
shapes the playing field in which the court itself carries out its own
functions.
Garrett's analysis of framework legislation usefully draws attention to
the particulars of the modem legislative process. Insofar as this
symposium contribution is part of a larger project, we can look forward
to the insights this typology of legislation provides for normative
debates about constitutional and statutory interpretation. Do framework
laws that set out to regulate the behavior of certain non-legislative
30.

Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP.

LEGAL ISSUES

717 (2005).

branches raise difficult separation of powers issues? And, if so, how
ought courts to confront, with the benefit of Garrett's typology, these
constitutional questions?
With regard to the issues of statutory
interpretation central to this symposium, what light does this discussion
of framework legislation shed on the question of how courts ought best
to construe legislation that is more like structural architecture than like
ordinary public policy?
More generally, the Garrett article focuses our attention squarely on
the idea that the legislative process is deeply political. Statutes are
fundamental political instruments. However we might view the role of
the courts in construing statutes, courts will only get themselves in
trouble when they forget that the nature of the legislative process is
deeply political. Interpretations of controversial statutes may yield
unintended consequences. Consider the recent example of state marriage
legislation. Scholars and pundits alike have noted the connection between
the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the voter
turnout for President Bush.3' The political consequences of interpretations
are a key element of the calculus undergirding competing theories of
statutory interpretation; or, to put the point a different way, interpretation
theorists ought to be conscious of the real and potential political
consequences of certain interpretations and interpretive approaches.
Steering our attention toward the political structure of lawmaking in the
modem Congress helps us better to understand these consequences.
An equally important policymaking engine in the modem state is the
administrative agency. It is now nearly banal to observe that the modem
regulatory agency is a key piece of the policy puzzle. We can haggle
over the question whether agencies "make" or just "implement" law; but
it remains essentially true that a principal location for the creation of
what we think to be law, not to mention the performance of public
authority in the name of "we the people" are (mostly) unelected regulatory
officials.
The sum and substance of the rules governing the activities of these
regulatory agencies is what makes up administrative law. A leading
scholar of the subject, Peter Strauss writes in his symposium contribution of
the connection between more dynamic approaches to statutory interpretation
and the classic Administrative Procedure Act [APA].32 Strauss is
interested in the difficult question how best to reconcile the courts'
circumscribed role as "faithful agent" to the legislature with the
31.
See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives
and Policy Making by Direct Democracy, S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
32.
Peter Strauss, Statutes That Are Not Static-The Case of the APA, 14 J. CONTEMP.
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imperative of bringing public policy into the service of solving modem
problems. He notes, apropos, of the dynamic or "presentist" views of
interpretation, that "the legal framework as a whole changes as a statute
ages-not only because the statute itself may previously have been
interpreted, but also as common law develops and as new statutes are
enacted."33 And the (guarded) case for an approach to interpretation that
updates statutes for modem purposes is one that is, in Strauss's view,
fundamentally pragmatic. The overriding consideration ought to be to
avoid interpretations that will require excessive efforts on the part of
Congress to correct what it believes to be "bad" outcomes.
Strauss draws upon the structure and history of the APA to explain the
distinction he draws between more and less static views of legislation.
He views the APA as incorporating a more dynamic approach to
statutory change and, moreover, to interpretation. This dynamic approach is
reflected in both the approach the federal courts were expected to follow
in reviewing administrative agency decisions for compliance with the
proper norms of administrative fairness and rationality embodied in the
APA and in the approach, Strauss argues, courts ought to follow in
interpreting the commands of the APA as a statute. In the end, Strauss
aims to defend a position that, in their article on the antitrust laws,
Farber and McDonnell reject, that is, that there are particular types of
statutes which are designed to incorporate a strong role for judges in
formulating common law-in the case of the APA, a common law of
fair, rational process.

The contributions to these symposia, while diverse in focus and
perspective, illustrate well the ferment in the new statutory interpretation
literature.
More specifically, these distinguished authors help us
understand better the conundrum of legislative intent and intentionalist
theory. Though hardly the last word, the combined contributions shed
new light on the enduring puzzle of statutory interpretation in the
modem regulatory state.

33.

Id. at 18.

